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ARTICLE

THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER*

INTRODUCTION
Approximately two decades ago, when I was new to the professoriate,
I became fascinated with a simple question: Why do so many historians,
law professors, and political scientists seem to think the United States Supreme Court began with John Marshall? The introduction to American
Government textbooks I became familiar with in the 1990s left that impression. After I finished my Ph.D. dissertation on the Declaration of Independence’s role in constitutional interpretation and revised it into my first
book,1 I turned my attention to trying to answer the question about Marshall’s apotheosis.
I quickly decided that I would focus on what the Supreme Court did
before Marshall joined it. More specifically, I wanted to put together an
edited book on the justices who served on the Court prior to Marshall. Of
course, to do that I needed scholars willing to contribute chapters to the
book. Mark David Hall, a friend and classmate from graduate school, was
the only contributor I knew before starting the book. Mark had written his
Ph.D. dissertation—subsequently published as a book—on James Wilson’s
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University; Associated Scholar, Brown University’s
Political Theory Project. This article updates the Introduction I wrote for SERIATIM: THE SUPREME
COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998). I am grateful to NYU Press
for permission to do so. The update maintains the book’s original citation frequency and placement, which means there are somewhat fewer footnotes in the update than in a typical law journal
article. I thank Cindy Klingler for administrative assistance in transcribing the Introduction into an
editable format; Sean Burchett of the Supreme Court Historical Society for tracking down an old
issue of the Supreme Court Historical Society Quarterly I needed; and Bill Casto, Mark David
Hall, Steve Presser, and Jim Stoner for comments on the updated version of the piece. The article
is my contribution to the symposium on “The Pre-Marbury Constitution” hosted by the University
of St. Thomas Law Journal on November 14, 2016, and I dedicate it to the contributors to Seriatim: Sandra VanBurkleo, James Haw, Mark David Hall, Wythe Holt, Willis Whichard, Father Dan
Degnan, Steve Presser, Bill Casto, and Jim Stoner. Seriatim itself was dedicated to George Athan
Billias, who remains a working historian and an inspiration as he approaches his 100th birthday.
1. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995).
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legal and political philosophy, so Mark was an obvious choice to write the
Wilson chapter.2 Mark also helped me identify the leading authorities on
the other pre-Marshall Court justices. I contacted these scholars to ask if
they would be willing to write a chapter about their particular justice. All
agreed.3 None of the prospective authors knew who I was when I requested
this substantial commitment from them. Consequently, I credit my one-hundred percent success rate to a shared enthusiasm for the subject matter of
the book. The result of everyone’s hard work was Seriatim: The Supreme
Court Before John Marshall, which was published in hardcover by NYU
Press in 1998 and in paperback in 2000.4 What follows is an overview of
Seriatim, as well as an update on the reaction to the book and on the scholarship about the pre-Marshall Court that followed Seriatim’s publication.
I. OVERVIEW

OF

SERIATIM

A. The Pre-Marshall Court in the American Mind
Students of judicial institutions have come to appreciate that to understand any court we must understand its origins.5 Nowhere is this more significant than in the case of the Supreme Court, because the origins of that
institution are so closely identified with one justice—John Marshall. This
holds true no matter what one thinks of Marshall. For those who hold Marshall in high esteem—and most scholars do exactly that—the study of the
Court prior to 1801 makes more plain the stamp Marshall placed on the
institution. For those who view Marshall less heroically—as do several contributors to Seriatim—studying the pre-Marshall Court reveals what the institution might have been like had Marshall not accepted the nomination to
be chief justice.
Jumping ahead two centuries to the present, an examination of the Supreme Court before John Marshall reveals much of interest to students of
the institution. Marshallphiles will note, for example, the absence of the
institutional voice Marshall’s leadership was able to provide—an institutional voice that has been absent for much of modern history as well.6
2. See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON,
1742–1798 (1997). Mark has since become one of the leading political theorists of the American
Founding. See, e.g., MARK DAVID HALL, ROGER SHERMAN AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (2013).
3. No living scholar had written anything of substance on William Cushing or Bushrod
Washington. Jim Stoner volunteered to write the chapter about Justice Washington. I wrote the
chapter about Cushing.
4. SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott Douglas Gerber ed.,
1998).
5. See, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The “New Institutionalism,” and the
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Scott D. Gerber & Keeok Park, The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court: A Cross-Judicial Empirical Analysis of the Rehnquist Court Justices, 91 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 390 (1997) (featured in Richard Morin, Those Disagreeable Supremes, WASH.
POST, July 15, 1997, at C5, col. 4).
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Those who view Marshall less heroically will find in Seriatim, by contrast,
that among other things, judicial review—the Court’s most important power
in the American system of constitutional government—was understood by
the early justices, was argued for by them, and was practiced by them.
The conventional wisdom is, of course, that the Supreme Court became an important institution only after Marshall’s arrival and the opinion
rendered in Marbury v. Madison (1803). It is not exactly accurate to say
that the pre-Marshall Court has been completely ignored by students of the
judicial process, but most scholars on the subject stress the Court’s lack of
significance. Bernard Schwartz, for instance, concludes in A History of the
Supreme Court (1993) that “the outstanding aspect of the Court’s work during its first decade was its relative unimportance.”7 Similarly, George Lee
Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson comment in their 1981 volume of The
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court that the Court
was a
relatively feeble institution during the 1790s, too unimportant to
interest the talents of two men who declined President Adams’
offer of the position of Chief Justice, it . . . acquired in . . . a few
years’ time, and largely under the guiding hand of John Marshall,
more power than even the framers of the Constitution may have
anticipated.8
There is also the following observation by Robert G. McCloskey in
The American Supreme Court (1960), arguably the most important book
ever written about the Court:
It is hard for a student of judicial review to avoid feeling that
American constitutional history from 1789 to 1801 was marking
time. The great shadow of John Marshall, who became chief justice in the latter year, falls across our understanding of that first
decade; and it has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while they
and the audience await the appearance of the star.9
There are countless other examples of the pre-Marshall Court being
trivialized by law professors, historians, and political scientists.10 Invariably, scholars point out that Robert H. Harrison never served as an associate
justice after he was confirmed, and that William Cushing declined elevation
from associate to chief justice. Similarly, Charles C. Pinckney, Edward Rut7. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 33 (1993).
8. 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 7 (1981).
9. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 30 (1960). Sanford Levinson
has updated this classic tome several times over the years. Levinson includes Seriatim in the
updated bibliographical essay. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 344
(Sanford Levinson rev. ed., 6th ed. 2016).
10. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 7–34 (enlarged ed. 1988).

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST102.txt

30

unknown

Seq: 4

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

18-APR-18

13:36

[Vol. 14:1

ledge, Alexander Hamilton, and Patrick Henry—significant statesmen in
the 1790s—refused to be appointed to the Court, and several men who were
appointed resigned to accept other positions. Most notable among the latter
group, John Rutledge left the Court after two years to become chief justice
of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas; and John Jay, who spent
part of his Supreme Court tenure serving as minister to Great Britain, resigned from the Court to become governor of New York, and later refused
reappointment to the Court.
After noting the difficulty of staffing the early Supreme Court, scholars usually mention in passing a few cases, such as Hayburn’s Case (1792),
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), Ware v. Hylton (1796), Hylton v. United
States (1796), and Calder v. Bull (1798), and then hurry on to discuss related Marshall Court opinions. While some may hesitate for a moment to
address Chisholm v. Georgia, those who do typically emphasize that this
decision was overturned in 1798 by the Eleventh Amendment. Finally,
many scholars cite the absence of a separate Supreme Court building as
evidence that the early Court lacked prestige.11
There have been scholars, of course, who recognized that the early
Court has been neglected. Edward S. Corwin, for one, in his 1919 book
about John Marshall, wrote:
The pioneer work of the [pre-Marshall] Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation has, for all but special students, fallen into
something like obscurity owing to the luster of Marshall’s
achievements and to his habit of deciding cases without much
reference to precedent. But these early labors are by no means
insignificant, especially since they pointed the way to some of
Marshall’s most striking decisions.12
11. See, e.g., CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 98–101
(1943); FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO
1955, at 3–72 (1955).
Several histories of the Supreme Court are less guilty of trivializing the pre-Marshall Court
than are others, but even those works do not examine the contributions of the individual justices in
any depth. See generally 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 31–168 (rev. ed. 1926); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 1–58 (1985). The increasingly popular encyclopedia-style biographical collections of the Supreme Court are too basic to be
of much use to scholars. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES,
1789–1993 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993); THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS (Leon Friedman & Fred I. Israel eds., rev. ed., 5 vols., 1995);
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
12. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 17–18 (1919). This insight is especially rare in books about Marshall, which tend
to emphasize the inadequacy of the Court that preceded his. See, e.g., 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 120–121 (1919); LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN
LAW 363–364 (1974).
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Unfortunately, Corwin failed in his long and distinguished career to fill
this gap in the literature.
A few scholars have begun to challenge the idea that the Supreme
Court became important only when John Marshall arrived. The multi-volume project documenting the activity of the early Court edited by Maeva
Marcus and others, and Marcus’s edited collection of essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789, have been of great assistance in this regard.13 Also worth
noting is William R. Casto’s The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The
Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (1995). Casto, who
contributes an essay about Oliver Ellsworth to Seriatim, makes an important
contribution with his book by presenting a compelling theory as to why the
pre-Marshall Court is often viewed negatively. As Casto puts it:
Society in the late twentieth century—particularly political society—is usually viewed primarily in terms of conflicts of values
and interests. . . . The abiding theme of the early Supreme Court,
however, was precisely to the contrary. The Court sought to support the political branches of the new federal government, not to
oppose them.14
According to Casto, “Though the justices occasionally resorted to constitutional interpretation, their primary objective was to bolster and consolidate the new federal government.”15 The label of “mediocrity” attached to
the pre-Marshall Court, he concludes, “is probably due to the direct conflict
between the modern judicial paradigm of conflict and the early Court’s paradigm of support.”16
B. Insights from Biography
Although a few scholars have begun to pay attention to the pre-Marshall Court,17 much work remains to be done. One fruitful approach is to
examine the contributions pre-Marshall Court justices made as individuals
to American law and politics. After all, one does not need to subscribe to
the psychological and sociological tenets of legal realism to recognize that
any court, including the Supreme Court, is first and foremost composed of
13. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 8 vols., 1985–2007) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] ; ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1992). Five volumes of the Documentary History were in print at the time Seriatim
was published. The Documentary History renders largely obsolete George Lankevich’s more limited collection. See 1 THE FEDERAL COURT, 1787–1801 (George J. Lankevich ed., 1986).
14. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 247 (1995).
15. Id. at 213.
16. Id. at 249.
17. In addition to the work of Marcus and the previous and continuing efforts of the contributors to Seriatim, see STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY
JUDGES (1997). Other works will be discussed in Section II.B of this article.
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individuals.18 The biographical approach to the pre-Marshall Court is particularly appropriate, given that most of that Court’s business took place
while the justices were riding circuit. Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before
John Marshall was designed with a multiple biographical methodology in
mind.
The ten pre-Marshall Court justices (this number excludes the largely
unknown Thomas Johnson and Alfred Moore) are worthy of study because
of their impressive credentials and active involvement in America’s founding. Of the ten, three signed the Declaration of Independence, six were
members of the Federal Convention of 1787, and six were prominent members of their state ratifying conventions. Besides these credentials, seven
served in the Continental Congress, eight had held prior judicial posts, and
all served in state governments in some capacity. Two, Oliver Ellsworth
and William Paterson, co-wrote the Judiciary Act of 1789, which helped
shape the institution of the Court.
As the first president, George Washington had the unique opportunity
to nominate an entire Supreme Court. He took this responsibility seriously,
and regarded “the due administration of Justice as the strongest cement of
good government.” Consequently, he sought “the fittest characters to expound the laws and dispense justice.”19
In his classic study of the political history of the appointment process,
Henry J. Abraham identifies seven criteria employed by Washington to
choose Supreme Court justices:
(1) support and advocacy of the Constitution; (2) distinguished
service in the Revolution; (3) active participation in the political
life of state or nation; (4) prior judicial experience on lower tribunals; (5) either a “favorable reputation with his fellows” or personal ties with Washington himself; (6) geographic suitability; (7)
love of country.20
The result was a number of impressive appointees. The nation’s first
Court was composed of John Jay of New York, John Rutledge of South
Carolina, William Cushing of Massachusetts, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, John Blair of Virginia, and Robert H. Harrison of Maryland. The
original six justices never met together as the Court, however. On his way
to the inaugural session, Harrison fell ill; so ill, in fact, that he resigned his
18. See J. W. Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public Law, in ESSAYS ON
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME IN HONOR OF ALPHEUS T. MASON
215–227 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964).
19. Letter from George Washington to John Rutledge, (Sept. 29, 1789), in 1 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 13, at 20–21. President Washington wrote similar letters to all his nominees.
See James R. Perry, Supreme Court Appointments, 1789–1801: Criteria, Presidential Style, and
the Press of Events, 6 J. EARLY REP. 371, 374 (1986).
20. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 71–72 (3rd ed. 1992). For a detailed discussion of Washington’s
and Adams’s appointment processes, see Perry, supra note 19, at 380.
THE

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST102.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 7

18-APR-18

THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL

13:36

33

post without ever having sat on the Court. While Harrison’s resignation is
sometimes used as evidence to indicate that the early Court lacked prestige,
it should be noted that his death, just two months after his resignation, indicates the severity of his illness. Harrison was replaced by James Iredell of
North Carolina.
In 1791 the Supreme Court lost a second member, John Rutledge, who
resigned to become chief justice of the South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas. After South Carolinians Charles C. Pinckney and Edward Rutledge
had both declined, Washington offered the position to Thomas Johnson of
Maryland. Although Johnson accepted, he resigned within two years. William Paterson of New Jersey was then named to succeed Johnson.
Chief Justice John Jay was next to leave the Court, resigning in 1795
after being elected governor of New York. Washington’s decision to replace Jay with John Rutledge—who had expressed a desire to return to the
Supreme Court as chief justice—led to an embarrassing series of events.
Rutledge’s was a recess appointment, and during the recess he attacked the
Jay Treaty with such vitriol that his confirmation by the Senate was unlikely at best. Indeed, the Federalist-controlled Senate considered Rutledge’s assault on the treaty tantamount to treason and rejected his
appointment by a vote of ten to fourteen. Washington turned to Patrick
Henry to fill the center chair, but Henry declined the nomination. William
Cushing was then nominated and confirmed as the nation’s third chief justice. About a week later, Cushing, citing advanced age and ill health, resigned his promotion and returned to his position as the Court’s senior
associate justice. Finally, in 1796, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut became
chief justice, a post he held for a full four years.
The year 1796 was also when John Blair’s resignation from the Court
became effective. Washington offered Blair’s seat to Samuel Chase of Maryland, the converted Antifederalist, who accepted. Two years later, James
Wilson died in office, becoming the first justice to do so. After John Marshall had declined an invitation to serve as an associate justice, Wilson’s
seat was filled by his former law student, Bushrod Washington of Virginia.
James Iredell died the following year and was replaced by Alfred
Moore, a fellow North Carolinian. Moore served four years on the Court
with little distinction. Finally, in 1800, in a letter sent from France where he
was serving as a special envoy, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth resigned
from the Court. John Adams quickly nominated John Jay, who was confirmed by the Senate. Jay refused to serve, however. The chief justiceship
then fell to Adams’s secretary of state, John Marshall of Virginia, who has
since acquired the reputation as the “greatest” Supreme Court justice in
American history.21
21. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 81, 412–414.
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The difficulty Washington, and to a lesser extent Adams, had in staffing the Supreme Court is stressed by those who dismiss the significance of
the pre-Marshall Court. At a minimum, this perspective ignores the hardships faced by the early justices, such as illness and circuit riding.22 More
substantially, it overlooks the important contributions to American law and
politics made by the early justices, both on circuit, where most of their
judicial business was conducted, and before they arrived at the highest court
in the land, where their respective efforts in the founding of the American
regime were tremendous.
Scholars have long appreciated the value of studying individual Founders when trying to discern the character of the early American republic.
The scores of volumes and papers projects on John Adams, Alexander
Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Marshall, and George
Washington, among others, testify to this fact. In a real sense, Seriatim
picks up where Stephen B. Presser left off. Presser, who contributes an essay about Samuel Chase to Seriatim, demonstrated in his provocative book,
The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (1991), the value of examining the individual pre-Marshall Court justices—in Presser’s case, Chase—for
dispelling the myth of Marshall’s apotheosis.23 That said, the point of Seriatim is not that Marshall was not a force in American law and politics. There
is, after all, a difference between revisionism and fiction. Rather, Seriatim is
designed to put an end to the claim to unequivocal domination by Marshall
on early American jurisprudence.
C. John Marshall’s Apotheosis
Shortly before Seriatim’s publication I reviewed for the Journal of
American History what at the time were two new biographies of John Marshall. Both books, Charles F. Hobson’s The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (1996) and Jean Edward Smith’s John Marshall:
Definer of a Nation (1996),24 are welcome additions to scholarship and I
said so in my joint review.25 Unfortunately, both books perpetuate the myth
that Marshall is “The Father of the Court” and “The Jurist Who Started It
All.” To make the point more directly, these two books were twice reviewed together prior to my joint review, and the quoted titles to these reviews dramatically demonstrate the impression the books leave on
22. Numerous letters exist from different justices complaining about the onerous duty of
circuit riding—especially in the Southern Circuit. See, e.g., 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
13, at 731–732; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 126, 132, 288–290, 344; 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13, at 240.
23. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
24. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1996); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996).
25. Scott D. Gerber, Book Review, 84 J. AM. HIST. 658 (1997).
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readers.26 Gordon S. Wood is the author of the review entitled “The Father
of the Court.”27 If one of the greatest living early American historians can
default to clichés about the early Supreme Court, then clearly more work
needs to be done on the origins of the Court.
Given the supposition that John Marshall is unduly credited with almost everything significant to spring from the early Supreme Court, the
question that must be asked is this: Why is Marshall glorified? The answer
to this question is not as clear as one might think. Hobson, the longtime
editor of The Papers of John Marshall, wrote the following response to a
query from me in which I speculated that Marshall’s apotheosis was the
handiwork of Albert J. Beveridge’s politically inspired biography of
1916–1919:
Marshall’s greatness was recognized long before Beveridge. At
his death in 1835 he had a reputation as a great statesman, if not
always free from controversy. John Adams in 1825 wrote to Marshall that it was “the pride of my life that I have given to this
nation a Chief Justice equal to Coke or Hale, Holt or Mansfield.”
John Quincy Adams entered these words in his diary, a few days
after Marshall died: “John Marshall . . . was one of the most eminent men that this country has ever produced.” Marshall’s colleague, Joseph Story, delivered a memorable eulogy of the chief
justice that wonderfully captures the essence of Marshall’s greatness. Now, it is true that post-Civil War nationalism enhanced
Marshall’s standing and that Beveridge wrote in that context—
attempting to make Marshall into a symbolic hero of Am[erican]
nationalism, like Lincoln. Hope this helps.28
Help it does. There is, however, a difference between being a great
politician and a great judge.29 Other scholars offer a far more partisan-oriented account of Marshall’s deification than Hobson does. R. Kent
Newmyer, the dean of judicial biographers, answers the question as
follows:
The process of glorification was launched with Allan Magruder’s
worshipful biography in 1890; it gained momentum with the Marshall Day celebration of 1901 (the outcome of which was a three26. See also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1835
(1997).
27. Gordon S. Wood, The Father of the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 17, 1997, at 38. See also
Mark Miller, The Jurist Who Started It All, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1996, at A20.
28. E-mail from Charles F. Hobson to author (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author).
29. It is difficult to deny that Marshall was a great politician. Only a great politician could do
what Marshall did in Marbury: announce that the Jefferson administration was wrong to withhold
the judicial commissions in question and that courts could issue writs to compel public officials to
do their prescribed duty—but that the Supreme Court had no power to issue such writs in the case
at bar because the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Court the power to do so was
unconstitutional. In short, a showdown with the Jefferson administration was avoided, but Marshall still was able to “reaffirm” the Court’s power of judicial review.
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volume collection of encomiums compiled by John F. Dillon);
and it culminated with Albert Beveridge’s The Life of John Marshall (4 vols., 1916–1919) and Charles Warren’s The Supreme
Court in United States History (2 vols., 1922). With prodigious
documentation Beveridge unabashedly celebrated the victory of
light (conservative nationalism) over darkness (Jeffersonian
states’ rights agrarianism). And, by sheer force of emphasis and
pervasive romanticism, his work raised Marshall above the Court,
depicting him as the epic hero of American nationalism. Warren’s
history (still one of the outstanding works on the Court) was more
scholarly, more balanced, and more generous in spreading the
glory to include Marshall’s colleagues but showed the same preference for conservative nationalism.30
Finally, Presser emphasizes—in his typically provocative fashion—
more recent events: The need for “liberal” academics to use Marshall’s
“supposed greatness” to “legitimize” the rash of post-1937 “liberal” Supreme Court decisions. Presser explains:
“Liberal” court critics since the early 1920s and 1930s had argued
that the Supreme Court’s job was to accommodate the Constitution to the changing economic and social needs of the country. It
seems more than coincidental that at about the time the courts
were frustrating implementation of New Deal legislation, scholars
began lavishly to praise John Marshall for his famous decisions. . . . Similarly, when liberal academics praised the Warren
Court’s expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect the victims of educational, political, and economic discrimination, more volumes appeared apotheosizing Marshall.31
Whatever one’s position regarding the pedigree of John Marshall’s
apotheosis, as far as the conventional wisdom is concerned, Marshall still
casts a long shadow—an eclipse—across the history of the early Supreme
Court. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the debate over the origins of
judicial review in America.
D. The “Myth” of Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Scholars have appreciated for some time that Marbury v. Madison was
not sewn from whole cloth.32 From Sir Edward Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bon30. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 20–21 (1968).
See also Letter from William E. Leuchtenburg to author (Nov. 18, 1995) (on file with author) (“It
is not my impression, though Chuck Hobson should know a good deal more, that Marshall had the
reputation he does today in the 19th Century. He was seen then as considerably more of an embattled Federalist and a champion of certain interests.”).
31. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 23, at 172.
32. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1293
(1988) (arguing that the origins of judicial review are to be found in the colonial period). Marshall
himself acknowledged as much. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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ham’s Case (1610), to James Otis’s speech against the Writs of Assistance
(1761), to a series of pre-federal Constitution state-court cases,33 to Federalist No. 78, there exist a lot of pre-Marbury precedents for judicial review.
More to the point, the essays that constitute Seriatim reveal that virtually
every member of the pre-Marshall Court played an important role in establishing the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review—a power that is synonymous to this day with John Marshall’s most famous opinion.34 Indeed,
many of the justices championed judicial review long before they were appointed to the Court. My essay on William Cushing, for example, suggests
that even before independence was declared, Cushing was charging grand
juries in Massachusetts that courts had the authority to declare acts of Parliament unconstitutional,35 while Wythe Holt describes how John Blair participated in at least three early cases involving judicial review in Virginia.36
Furthermore, Willis Whichard points out that James Iredell articulated on
several occasions before the Constitution went into effect perhaps the most
sophisticated argument for judicial review offered during the Founding37
(an argument with which Marshall was almost certainly familiar).38 James
Haw reveals that, despite fighting hard in the Federal Convention of 1787 to
protect the power of state courts, John Rutledge both expected and supported federal judicial review,39 and William Casto demonstrates that OliMoreover, President Jefferson, who came to resent Marbury, was not taken aback by the judicialreview aspects of the decision. (Jefferson believed that the Court, as well as the president and
Congress, had the right to pass on the constitutionality of matters before it.) Rather, he resented
Marshall’s obiter dictum that William Marbury was entitled to his judicial commission.
33. The state-court cases include Josiah Philips’s Case (Va., 1778), Holmes v. Walton (N.Y.,
1780), Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y., 1784), The Symsbury Case (Conn., 1785), Trevett v. Weeden (R.I., 1786), and Bayard v. Singleton (N.C., 1787). There is considerable debate in the scholarly community about the status of these early cases.
34. See, e.g., DAVID G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3–9
(1993) (emphasizing Marbury v. Madison); JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 420 (6th ed. 1995) (same). See also SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 24, at 313. Of course, there have been specific studies of judicial review over
the years, particularly by historians, that recognize that Marbury has been overemphasized. See,
e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008); J. M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF
THE LONG ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989); see generally SCOTT
DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY,
1606–1787 (2011). My point is that the conventional wisdom is still to the contrary—and that the
role the pre-Marshall Court justices played in the origins of judicial review has been largely
overlooked.
35. Scott Douglas Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at
114.
36. See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and Conscientious Judge,” in SERIATIM, supra note
4, at 160–161.
37. See Willis P. Whichard, James Iredell: Revolutionist, Constitutionalist, Jurist, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 218.
38. See also William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review,
27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995).
39. See James Haw, John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in SERIATIM, supra note 4,
at 78–79.
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ver Ellsworth endorsed the concept of judicial review at the Connecticut
ratifying convention.40
As sitting justices, the individuals who preceded John Marshall to the
Supreme Court continued to advocate for judicial review. The best-known
examples of this are William Paterson’s jury charge in Vanhorne’s Lessee
v. Dorrance (1795)41 and Samuel Chase’s jury charge in the trial of James
Callender in 1800. As Father Daniel Degnan’s essay about Paterson and
Presser’s about Chase suggest, these jury charges helped to pave the way
for public acceptance of judicial review.42 Similarly, Mark David Hall demonstrates in his James Wilson essay that Wilson presented the case for judicial review in his famous law lectures of 1790–1792—lectures that
influenced generations of American lawyers.43 Students of the Court, moreover, are remiss if they fail to appreciate, as Father Degnan and Casto describe in their respective essays, that the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
Paterson and Ellsworth co-wrote when they were serving in the Senate, authorized federal courts to review decisions from the states’ highest courts if
they involved certain federal questions.
The justices who composed the Supreme Court before John Marshall
did more than simply advocate for judicial review; they practiced it. Barely
a year had passed since the establishment of the federal courts when Chief
Justice John Jay and Associate Justice William Cushing, on circuit, declared several states’ laws unconstitutional. There is also Ware v. Hylton
(1796), in which Justices Chase, Cushing, Paterson, and Wilson, sitting together as the Supreme Court,44 struck down a Virginia statute on the ground
that it violated a treaty and, hence, the supremacy clause of the Constitution.45 Moreover, James Stoner points out in his essay about Bushrod
Washington that Washington, who was accused in a widely repeated remark
of being little more than a double for Marshall46—an accusation that Stoner

40. William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your
Administration,” in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 298.
41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (Paterson, Circuit Justice 1795).
42. Daniel A. Degnan, William Paterson: Small States’ Nationalist, in SERIATIM, supra note
4, at 241; Stephen B. Presser, The Verdict on Samuel Chase and His “Apologist,” in SERIATIM,
supra note 4, at 264.
43. Mark David Hall, James Wilson: Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in
SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 131.
44. Iredell had been one of the judges in the lower circuit court that adjudicated the case.
Consequently, he did not participate in the Supreme Court’s decision. He did take the unusual
step, however, of reading into the record his thoughts on the matter.
45. Ellsworth, who was not serving on the Supreme Court at the time Ware was decided,
voiced his agreement with the decision in Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 340 (C.C.D.N.C.
1796) (No. 5,980).
46. James R. Stoner, Jr., Heir Apparent: Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice in the
Early Republic, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 331–332.
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rejects—asserted in Cooper v. Telfair (1800) that the Court possessed the
power of judicial review.47
The pre-Marshall Court justices exercised judicial review over federal
law as well. As Holt’s and Hall’s essays describe, the first clear occasion in
which this occurred was Hayburn’s Case (1792), wherein Justices James
Wilson and John Blair, on circuit, declared the Invalid Pensioners Act of
1792 unconstitutional. The Court as a whole, in the then-unreported United
States v. Yale Todd (1794), appears to have concurred with Wilson and
Blair’s position.48 Perhaps most important, in Hylton v. United States
(1796) the Court reviewed a congressional tax on carriages to determine
whether the tax was constitutional. The Court concluded that it was, but the
justices nevertheless recognized their power to declare otherwise. Indeed,
Hall reports that when John Wickham, the counsel for the government, offered at the circuit level to address the issue of judicial review, Justice Wilson told him to sit down and be quiet because the issue had “come before
each of the judges in their different circuits, and they all concurred in the
opinion” that the Court could declare congressional statutes
unconstitutional.49
More examples of pre-Marbury incidents of judicial review could be
discussed,50 but it should be clear by now that the pre-Marshall Court justices understood the concept of judicial review, that they argued for it, and
that they practiced it. There is also abundant evidence that Marshall was
both fully aware of, and substantially influenced by, these early precedents.
47. See also the seriatim opinions of Justices Chase, Paterson, and Cushing in Cooper v.
Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18–20 (1800), as well as Pennhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 54 (1795).
48. Yale Todd was cited in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851). Maeva
Marcus suggests, but does not conclude, that the Supreme Court ruled that Yale Todd’s pension
was invalid because the judges of the circuit courts wrongly interpreted the statute to allow them
to act as commissioners and hear claims. See Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE “EXTENDED REPUBLIC”: THE FEDERALIST ERA 25, 41 n.54 (Ronald L.
Hoffman ed., 1996). Marcus, in an earlier essay written with Robert Teir, suggests, but again does
not conclude, that the Supreme Court in Yale Todd declared the statute unconstitutional. See
Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 527, 531 n.25 (1988).
John Marshall himself—and in Marbury v. Madison, no less—made note of another unreported case, Chandler v. Secretary of War (1794), in which the Court appears to have invalidated
an executive act. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 172 (discussing the case). Susan Low Bloch
and Marcus suggest, but once again do not conclude, that Chandler was decided on other than
constitutional grounds. See Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall’s Selective Use of
History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301, 315 n.54 (1986). But see Gordon E.
Sherman, The Case of John Chandler v. The Secretary of War, 14 YALE L.J. 431, 437 (1905)
(arguing that Chandler was decided on constitutional grounds). Bloch and Marcus maintain that
Marshall manipulated precedents such as Chandler to get his desired political result in Marbury.
See Bloch & Marcus, supra, at 301–337.
49. Scott Douglas Gerber, Introduction: The Supreme Court before John Marshall, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 11.
50. See GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 34; Marcus, Judicial Review in the
Early Republic, supra note 48, at 25–53.
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Presser suggests, for example, that Marshall was in the audience when Samuel Chase delivered his jury charge in the Callender trial and that Marshall later adopted some of Chase’s language in his Marbury opinion.51
Similarly, Whichard advises that Marshall’s opinion in Marbury drew upon
Iredell’s well-known writings on judicial review.52 Finally, I surmise in my
essay about Cushing that Cushing and/or Paterson probably made Marshall
aware of the early Court’s precedents on judicial review.53
E. An “Interdisciplinary Conversation”
All of this said, Seriatim is important not only because it provides new
information about the substantive contributions made to American law and
politics by the pre-Marshall Court justices, but also because of what the
collection says about the method of studying the early American republic.
Law, history, and political science are all represented in the collection, and
each of these separate disciplines is represented by a diversity of methodological (as well as ideological) viewpoints. By including essays from a
variety of methodological perspectives, Seriatim aspires to move research
on the American Founding in new directions.
The five law professors among the contributors consist of one, Wythe
Holt (who also is trained in history), who emphasizes social, political, and
economic events; a second, Willis Whichard, who utilizes the descriptive
techniques of biography; a third, Father Daniel Degnan, who employs the
doctrinal focus of traditional legal analysis; a fourth, Stephen Presser, who
combines the melding of biography, political science, and intellectual history (in the tradition of J. G. A. Pocock) with the fervor of a polemicist; and
a fifth, William Casto, who highlights the psychological aspects of individual legal and political behavior. Karl Llewellyn, who long ago urged academic lawyers to employ more social science methods, would be pleased.54
Two of the contributors teach primarily in history departments. The
first, Sandra VanBurkleo, attempts to locate her subject within the context
and languages of his particular historical moment. She identifies relationships between the subject and the prevailing intellectual currents, socioeconomic developments, and political climate of the time, much as Holt does
from the legal academy (albeit without Holt’s Marxist orientation). The second, James Haw, approaches his justice through the descriptive and narrative method of a “traditional” historian.
Last, but it is to be hoped not least, the three political scientists also
approach their justices in diverse ways. Although Mark David Hall and
51.
52.
53.
54.
ESSAYS
1968).

Presser, supra note 42, at 264.
Whichard, supra note 37, at 202.
Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, supra note 35, at 114.
See Karl Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—A Realist’s Critique, in
ON RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 89 (Leverett S. Lyon et al. eds., 1931; reprt.,
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James Stoner both utilize the method of political theory, Stoner’s Straussian
orientation gives his essay a flavor different from that of Hall’s. My essay
on Cushing is more disparate still: it employs deconstruction as a methodological approach.55
In short, the contributors to Seriatim are engaged in an “interdisciplinary conversation” in the best sense of that phrase.56 Although none of the
contributors (the editor included) are methodologists, let alone philosophers
of science, we all share a commitment to both methodological self-consciousness and methodological pluralism. We value methodological selfconsciousness because those who fail to pay attention to method are almost
always in the grip of a prevailing methodology. (Here, we are paraphrasing
John Maynard Keynes’s famous retort that those who dislike theory or
claim to do without it are simply in the grip of an older theory.) We value
methodological pluralism because a prevailing methodology might not be
the “best” methodology, let alone the “perfect” methodology. A comparison
between perhaps the two most diametrically opposed methodologies represented in Seriatim will illustrate why we take methodology so seriously.
In his chapter on John Rutledge, James Haw employs the methodology
of a “traditional” historian, writing descriptive, narrative history in relatively narrow terms.57 More than anything else it is, in the words of Arthur
M. Schlesinger, Sr., “the business of the historian to find, collect, classify,
and appraise data relating to the past.”58 Haw’s essay on Rutledge, with its
painstaking attention to archival materials and myriad new discoveries
about this controversial member of the pre-Marshall Court, is a testament to
the continuing vitality and relevance of good “old-fashioned” history.
By contrast, my chapter on William Cushing employs one of the most
popular—and controversial—methodologies of the postmodern age;
“namely,” deconstruction.59 Where Haw seeks to provide “new” information about John Rutledge’s contributions to American law and politics, I
attempt to reverse and resituate the “existing” conceptual priorities upon
which the various orderings and evaluations of William Cushing and, consequently, of John Marshall, thrive.
Can students of the early American judiciary learn from deconstruction
as well as from traditional history? from political theory as well as from
doctrinal legal analysis? from psychology as well as from social, political,
and economic considerations? from the melding of biography, political sci55. I now teach in a law school.
56. This phrase was coined by historian Peter S. Onuf in a refreshing essay criticizing his
fellow historians of the American Founding for attempting to defend history against “alien disciplines.” See Peter S. Onuf, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 341 (1989).
57. See Haw, John Rutledge, supra note 39, at 70–96.
58. Arthur M. Schlesinger, History: Mistress and Handmaid, in LYON, ESSAYS ON RESEARCH
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 54, at 139.
59. See Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, supra note 35, at 97–125.
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ence, and intellectual history as well as from “unadulterated” biography?
from a Straussian orientation as well as from a Marxist orientation? We
hope the reader will grapple with these questions. A brief summary of the
essays that constitute Seriatim may provide some assistance in this regard.
The essays appear in the order of the justices’ respective appointments to
the Supreme Court.
F. The Findings
Sandra VanBurkleo explores in her essay relationships between John
Jay’s intellectual “system”—that is, his systematic political and economic
philosophies—and his conception of the Supreme Court’s role in government.60 Unlike some of Seriatim’s contributors, she challenges the notion
that Jay’s jurisprudence (and, for that matter, his bench) can best be understood by tightening the links between Jay and Marshall—that is, by rendering the federal judicial experience more continuous and homogenous. That
approach, she contends, is unacceptably Whiggish. Jay has to be understood
on his own terms as both a product and an architect of the early phases of
the American Revolution. First and foremost a diplomat, Jay had in mind a
federal judiciary quite unlike the system refashioned and consolidated by
John Marshall after 1801. To draw straight lines between past and present,
to rub out strange and abandoned practices, VanBurkleo thinks, is to impoverish the present by eliminating an important part of the republic’s past.
Thus, she introduces a certain amount of distance between Jay and Marshall: Jay was extremely important—but not as a harbinger of Marshall.
Rather, his now mostly archaic vision of federal practice offers ripe opportunities for comparative study and cultural-historical enrichment.
James Haw describes John Rutledge’s distinguished career.61 He was a
lawyer, colonial and state legislator, member of the Continental Congress,
governor of South Carolina during most of the War of Independence, chancellor and later chief justice of South Carolina, delegate to the Federal Convention of 1787, and associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Haw discusses how at the Constitutional Convention Rutledge advocated a mixed republic in which gentlemen would govern in the public interest, and sought to safeguard the interests of South Carolina. But, Haw
suggests, Rutledge was willing to compromise repeatedly to achieve a more
effective central government. Rutledge’s most important contributions,
Haw believes, were chairing the Committee of Detail, and helping to secure
the enumeration of congressional powers, the necessary and proper clause,
and safeguards for the deep South on the slave trade and taxation of
exports.
60. See Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honour, Justice, and Interest”: John Jay’s Republican
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in SERIATIM, supra note 4, at 26–69.
61. See Haw, supra note 39, at 70–96.
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Haw characterizes Rutledge’s judicial philosophy as being quite conservative. Rutledge believed that judges should follow established legal
constructions unless the legislature clearly changed them. Occasionally,
however, he allowed equitable or political considerations to influence his
rulings. His service on the federal bench was too brief to permit any major
contribution there, Haw concludes. From 1792 through 1795, his deep
mental depression produced erratic behavior that, combined with his outspoken opposition to the Jay Treaty, led the Senate to reject Rutledge’s
nomination as chief justice in 1795. Consequently, more than any of the
justices chronicled in Seriatim, the vast majority of Rutledge’s contributions to American law and politics occurred independent of his Supreme
Court service.
My essay on William Cushing endeavors to disrupt the conventional
wisdom that Cushing is but a footnote in the text of American history.62
Instead of viewing Cushing as the Dan Quayle of the early American republic—in other words, as an intellectual lightweight who rose to power
through family and political connections—I argue that Cushing contributed
much to American law and politics (perhaps as much as John Marshall).
My deconstruction of William Cushing reveals that he played a leading role in Massachusetts in, among other things, abolishing slavery and
securing ratification of the federal Constitution. Cushing also had a great
deal to do with the development of judicial review in America and, most
importantly, with establishing the “textualist” approach to legal interpretation—an approach for which, like judicial review itself, John Marshall has
been given undue credit over the years.
Mark David Hall explains in his essay on James Wilson that while
many students of the early American republic know about Wilson’s extensive contributions to the framing and ratification of the Constitution, few
are aware of the quality of his political thought.63 In fact, Hall argues that
once Wilson’s political theory is understood, his contributions at the Constitutional Convention and on the Supreme Court fall readily into place.
Hall makes clear that central among Wilson’s political ideas was his
belief that all individuals possess natural rights that must be protected by
government. Contrary to many of his contemporaries, Wilson contended
that thoroughly democratic institutions provide the best protection for both
minority and majority rights. As a result, he supported the direct, popular
election of representatives, senators, and executives. His democratic theory
also informed his view of federalism, leading him to be a consistent nationalist. Yet Wilson did not hold a naive faith in the people, as indicated by his
support for countermajoritarian checks such as judicial review. Hall attempts to reconcile Wilson’s support of these checks with his democratic
62. See Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, supra note 35, at 97–125.
63. See Hall, supra note 43, at 126–154.
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theory, and ultimately concludes that Wilson was the foremost advocate
among the Founders of a strong and democratic government that also protects minority rights.
Wythe Holt characterizes John Blair as a wealthy, well-connected, and
influential merchant, planter, legislator, and lawyer from the powerful Tidewater aristocracy who was an important leader of second rank when Virginia joined most of the colonies in the drive for independence.64 Blair won
repute serving on Virginia’s highest courts and, as a member of the Constitutional Convention and Virginia’s ratification convention, he silently aided
the formation of a new government for the new nation.
Holt’s essay demonstrates that, as a member of the first Supreme
Court, Blair cautiously but steadily in actions and opinions showed himself
to be a staunch Federalist and a supporter of the mercantile-oriented, weak
new central government, imperiled from within by agrarian and democratic
dissent and from without by imperialistic European powers. He was, however, neither a profound writer nor a leader on the Court. But, Holt insists,
the proper criterion by which to assess the Court’s opinions in the perilous
1790s is their political effectiveness in persuasively upholding the power,
authority, and respect of the government while exciting no dismembering
discontent; and the proper gauge of its members is their courage and consistency in supporting the new Constitution and its constituted government.
On both of these measures, the amiable, safe, and conscientious John Blair
ranks at the top, Holt concludes, because his clear pronouncements empowering the government were phrased narrowly so as to provoke no animosity,
even though he was the only southern justice consistently to support Federalist positions.
Willis Whichard explains that James Iredell came to America as a British official to be the comptroller of customs in Edenton, North Carolina.65
Iredell studied law under Samuel Johnston, a politically influential lawyer,
and acquired the reputation of a superior lawyer. In his most significant
case as counsel, Whichard reveals, Iredell advocated the concept of judicial
review. He also championed it in a series of sophisticated letters and essays.
Whichard demonstrates how Iredell became a leading essayist for the
American cause in the Revolution and a bellwether for the Federalist forces
in the effort to ratify the federal Constitution. Iredell answered George Mason’s objections, led other literary efforts, and served as floor leader for the
Federalist forces at the initial North Carolina ratification convention. When
that convention failed to approve the Constitution, Iredell continued his endeavors until a second convention ratified the document. President Washington rewarded Iredell’s efforts by appointing him to the Supreme Court.
Whichard suggests that the grasp of constitutional questions Iredell dis64. See Holt, supra note 36, at 155–197.
65. See Whichard, supra note 37, at 198–230.
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played in promoting ratification was the foremost reason for the
appointment.
Whichard maintains that Iredell’s most significant opinion was his dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia. In that case Iredell took the position that a
citizen of one state could not sue another state. The Eleventh Amendment
incorporated Iredell’s position into the Constitution. Iredell spent most of
his Court years traveling the circuits. He led efforts to terminate or reduce
the travel but, Whichard reveals, those efforts were largely to no avail. His
work on circuit undermined his health, and he died after a near-decade of
service.
Father Daniel Degnan reminds us that William Paterson was a member
of the Constitutional Convention and author of the New Jersey, or smallstates, plan.66 Despite his advocacy of the rights of the smaller states, however, Paterson proved to be a consistent nationalist. As a member of the first
Senate, Paterson was a principal coauthor, with Oliver Ellsworth, of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The first nine sections of the act, establishing the
federal district and circuit courts, were in Paterson’s handwriting.
Paterson served on the Supreme Court from 1793 to 1806 where, Father Degnan argues, his work was a continuation of his work in the convention and the Senate. For Paterson, prize capture on the high seas evoked the
plenary power of the national government in foreign affairs. The national
power to tax, he believed, was not to be narrowly constrained. State laws
were to be tested by the new Constitution, as were state court decisions on
the issue. Congress had the power to abolish federal courts (as well as to
establish them), although judges would lose their positions. Practical contemporary construction was dispositive.
Perhaps most interesting, Father Degnan suggests, is that Paterson issued in a circuit court case one of the most striking early statements of the
doctrine of judicial review: “What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first
principles of fundamental laws are established. . . . [E]very act of the Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.”67 To Paterson,
Father Degnan concludes, these principles formed a straight line from the
Constitutional Convention and the first Senate through the foundations laid
by the early Supreme Court.
Was Samuel Chase, the only Supreme Court justice ever to be impeached, a partisan bully unfit to sit on the bench (as his Jeffersonian tormentors insisted), or was he unfairly attacked for seeking to maintain the
rule of law when it was under partisan assault (as the defenders at his trial
before the Senate maintained)?68 While most historians are prepared to con66. See Degnan, supra note 42, at 231–259.
67. Id. at 243.
68. See Presser, supra note 42, at 260–291.
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cede Chase’s obvious brilliance, his hair-trigger temper and his obduracy
led one recent historian—Seriatim’s own William Casto—flatly to declare
that Chase’s appointment was “one of the most regrettable nominations in
the Court’s history.”69
In 1991 Stephen Presser published his book The Original Misunderstanding, a summation of fifteen years of work, to argue that Chase should
be regarded as one of the greatest of the early Supreme Court justices, and
someone who articulated a vision of constitutional law more in keeping
with the Framers’ original understanding than did John Marshall. Presser’s
book intrigued historians and academic lawyers, who had quite different
responses to his thesis and to Samuel Chase. In his essay in Seriatim,
Presser revisits Chase’s contributions to American law and politics, responds to his critics, and explores some of the tensions facing scholars who
write legal history.70
William Casto approaches his essay on Oliver Ellsworth as an assault
upon anachronistic preconceptions that many scholars have about the
Founding generation.71 Specifically, Casto argues that there is a tendency to
emphasize the secular aspects of political life in the early republic and to
deemphasize the religious dimensions. Casto also insists that our modernday preconceptions of the proper role of judges in political life has distorted
our analysis of judicial conduct in the early American republic. The concept
of separation of powers and the ideal of judicial aloofness from political
controversy have changed substantially over the past several decades, Casto
maintains.
Casto uses Ellsworth as an archetype to illustrate two points. First,
Ellsworth was a thoroughgoing religionist who viewed his public and private activities through the lens of Calvinism. The point is not that Ellsworth’s religion caused him to act in different ways—although Casto
suspects that it did. Instead, Casto believes that Calvinism was the organizing philosophy of Ellsworth’s life and that he and others like him cannot be
understood if his faith is marginalized. Second, with respect to his judicial
conduct in the early republic, Chief Justice Ellsworth is depicted as one
who was deeply involved in the national politics of the late 1790s. Casto
believes that Ellsworth viewed himself not so much as a judge but, rather,
as an active participant in public life who happened to be a judge.
Finally, in his essay on Bushrod Washington, James Stoner makes a
powerful case for viewing Washington as a bridge between the pre-Mar69. Gerber, Introduction, supra note 49, at 18 (quoting Casto).
70. Readers will notice that Presser’s essay is structured differently than the others in the
book. Because Seriatim essentially picks up where Presser left off with his earlier work on Chase,
we thought readers might find it interesting to see why Presser did what he did there and what the
reaction to his work has been.
71. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 292–321.
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shall Court and the more famous Marshall Court.72 Consequently, Stoner
explodes the myth that Washington and Marshall should be viewed, as William Johnson once charged, as “one Judge.”73
Stoner argues that, though Bushrod Washington lived in the shadow of
two great men—his uncle George Washington and his friend of fifty years,
John Marshall—he was an independent man who left his mark on federal
justice and helped make possible the extraordinary unity of the Marshall
Court. (This latter achievement is yet another for which Marshall receives
undue credit.) Educated in law by George Wythe and James Wilson, and
distinguishing himself at an early age on the Richmond bar, Washington
was appointed to the Court by John Adams in 1798. From the start, his
jurisprudence was characterized by respect for legislative authority, a sense
of exact justice, and a certain moderation. Stoner makes it clear that although Washington is largely overlooked today, he was a highly respected
judge in his own day.
G. A Word Is Worth a Thousand Pictures
This, then, is what is chronicled in Seriatim. Before I describe the reaction to the book and the scholarship on the pre-Marshall Court that has
followed the book’s publication, it might be useful for me to say a few
words about why the collection is titled Seriatim (Latin for “severally” or
“in series”).
As judicial process scholars probably know, the practice in English
appellate courts is for all of the participating judges to write, and deliver
orally, individual opinions explaining their views on a case. This process is
known as “seriatim” opinion writing. (The seriatim custom originated in the
jury-charge practice of the common-law courts.) Seriatim opinion writing
was also the practice used in early American appellate courts—the U.S.
Supreme Court included—before, that is, John Marshall became chief
justice.
When John Marshall was appointed chief justice in 1801, he put an
end to the practice of seriatim opinion writing. Chief Justice Marshall did so
because he believed that the Supreme Court’s “power and prestige” would
be enhanced if it spoke with a “single voice.”74 To that end, Marshall established the practice of a single “opinion of the Court”—almost always
signed, at least in the early days of his chief justiceship, by Marshall himself75—that would reflect the views of the Court as an institution and be
72. Stoner, supra note 46, at 322–350.
73. Id. at 332 (quoting William Johnson).
74. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 199 (6th ed. 1993).
75. Haskins and Johnson make an interesting case for the possibility that the opinion of the
Court was delivered, but not necessarily written, by the senior justice who participated in the case.
Given that Marshall was both chief justice and rarely absent, this tended to be Marshall. See
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recorded and reported to the public. As with any collaborative product,
however, this new practice meant that differences among the justices were
adjusted internally and, consequently, hidden from public view. Although
this was plainly Marshall’s intention, the end of seriatim opinion writing
meant that the contributions of individual justices were difficult, if not impossible, to discern. This, we suspect, goes a long way toward explaining
why Marshall has come to eclipse in the conventional wisdom the other
justices of the early Supreme Court. And this, we believe, is unfortunate.
In short, the collection is titled Seriatim for three reasons: (1) because
the justices who composed the Supreme Court before John Marshall functioned, for the most part, and spoke, almost always, as individuals; (2) because we aspire to dispel the myth that the early Court became significant
only when Marshall arrived; and (3) because we hope to suggest something
of the drama in which the pre-Marshall Court justices performed their important duties. To make the point even more directly, a good book title
captures the essence of what the author endeavors to accomplish. The title
Seriatim does that for us.
II. THE REACTION TO SERIATIM AND THE SCHOLARSHIP
FOLLOWED SERIATIM’S PUBLICATION

THAT

HAS

A. The Reaction to Seriatim
As far as I know, Seriatim was reviewed approximately a dozen times,
which is a lot for an edited book. It was also included in the National Law
Journal’s “summer reading” list in July 1999, which was particularly unusual, especially given that the latest John Grisham legal thriller also was on
the list.76 We never thought Seriatim would be a beach book.
All but three of the reviews praised Seriatim, which was unusual too,
although gratifying. The first lukewarm review, that of Nova Southeastern
University Law School professor John Sanchez for Legal Studies Forum,
insisted that, “In my view, the book, while worthwhile, falls short of its
avowed goal to ‘destroy’ the claim to unequivocal domination by John Marshall on early American jurisprudence.”77 The second, that by University of
Washington School of Law professor Stewart Jay for the William and Mary
Quarterly, opined, “Overall, the book fails to bolster substantially the reputation of the pre-Marshall Court, and for some readers it actually may have
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 382–387 (discussing this subject, as well as the more
general subject of the transition from seriatim opinion writing to institutional opinion writing).
Casto maintains that Marshall merely solidified a custom—using institutional rather than seriatim
opinions—that Ellsworth initiated during his chief justiceship. See CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 14, at 110–111.
76. See Surfing the Books: Summer Reading; Even if they Aren’t, July and August Feel as if
they Should be for Lazing and Reading, NAT’L L.J. (New York), July 5, 1999, at A14–A15.
77. John Sanchez, Book Review, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 203, 203 (2000). Sanchez specializes in
employment law.
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the opposite effect.”78 The third, written for Continuity by K. R. Constantine Gutzman, a history professor at Western Connecticut State University,
maintained that, “While most of the chapters in this volume are quite nicely
done, they serve mainly to demonstrate that the Federalist presidents,
George Washington and John Adams, appointed uniformly able, accomplished Federalists to the high court; they do not dispel the impression that
the pre-Marshall Court’s work was relatively insignificant.”79
Fortunately for us, every other reviewer emphatically disagreed. For
example, Amy C. Kunstling proclaimed the following in a review for the
North Carolina Historical Review:
Most law students’ first-year constitutional law class begins with
a discussion of Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury
v. Madison, in which the United States Supreme Court famously
stated “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.” By beginning constitutional
law with the study of Marbury, students are left with two impressions: first, that the pre-Marshall Supreme Court’s contributions
were negligible and unworthy of study; and second, that Marbury
was the first time a federal court had recognized the concept of
judicial review. Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall, however, convincingly refutes these misimpressions.80
Two periodicals affiliated with the Supreme Court reviewed the book.
The review in The Supreme Court Historical Society Quarterly called Seriatim a “wonderful new book [that] challenges the idea that the Court did
nothing of importance prior to Marshall’s appointment. . . . [I]t seems destined to become a staple source for the Court’s first decade.”81 The Journal
of Supreme Court History said Seriatim was “well researched and generally
lively” and that “[w]hat sets Seriatim apart is not the importance its contributors claim for the early Court but the evidence they amass to support that
claim.”82
The review for the American Judges Association’s Court Review, albeit of the paperback edition, also commended Seriatim:
Gerber’s point in putting together the book appears to have been
two-fold: first, in his own words, “to dispel the myth that the
early Court became significant only when Marshall arrived,” and
second, to provide a good, three-dimensional portrait of each of
the justices included. The book succeeds on both fronts, including
78. Stewart Jay, Book Review, 57 WM. & MARY Q. 235, 236 (2000). Jay did say that
“[t]hese essays offer succinct yet informative biographies of jurists whose contributions to American law have been neglected until relatively recently.” Id. at 235.
79. K. R. Constantine Gutzman, Book Review, 29 CONTINUITY 89, 89 (2001).
80. Amy C. Kunstling, Book Review, 76 N.C. HIST. REV. 460, 460 (1999).
81. James B. O’Hara, New Literature on the Court, 19 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. Q., no. 3, 1998, at
5, 7, 13.
82. D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., Judicial Bookshelf, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 112, 118, 120 (2000).
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a spirited presentation of the ways in which these justices—well
before Marbury v. Madison—practiced and championed judicial
review. Originally issued in a more-expensive hardbound version,
this paperback edition is well worth its purchase price.83
Seriatim was likewise well received by two political scientists who
reviewed it. R. J. Steamer concluded for Choice that “[t]his creative and
imaginative analysis of America’s first national jurists is recommended for
all students of Supreme Court history,”84 while Tinsley Yarbrough wrote in
the Law and Politics Book Review that “[t]his absorbing collection of essays . . . goes far toward filling a void in the literature on the early justices
of the world’s most significant tribunal.”85
Historian R. B. Bernstein was equally kind in H-Net Reviews:
These valuable contributions to historical scholarship illuminate
an unjustly neglected era of the history of the federal judiciary.
They also force historians and legal scholars to reconsider how
they have studied the history of the federal courts, and they also
demand that general historians include the history of the federal
courts as a key thread of the political and constitutional history of
the early American Republic.86
Daniel L. Dreisbach concluded likewise in the Journal of the Early
Republic: “The book effectively challenges the claim that the Court did
little of significance before Marshall. Under an untested frame of government, guided by a vague constitutional mandate, and supported by colonial
antecedents and a controversial Judiciary Act, the pre-Marshall justices
helped shape the nation’s high court.”87
University of Chicago Law School professor David P. Currie wrote in
a review for the American Historical Review that Seriatim “does something
that has not been done before, and it is something worth doing.”88 He
continued:
The book’s title is both clever and descriptive. Not only did the
justices of the time deliver their opinions seriatim, which is to say
separately, but the book presents the justices themselves seriatim,
affording us not so much another analysis of the decisions of the
early Court (for which there is no crying need) as a better understanding of the individuals who made up that tribunal and of
whom our knowledge has been limited. . . . [E]ven one who has
83. The Resource Page: New Books: Scott Douglas Gerber (Ed.), Seriatim: The Supreme
Court before John Marshall, New York Univ. Press, 2000, 37 CT. REV. 52, 52 (2001).
84. R. J. Steamer, Book Review, 37 CHOICE, no. 2, Oct. 1999, http://choicereviews.org/re
view/10.5860/CHOICE.37-1219.
85. Tinsley Yarbrough, Book Review, 9 L. & POL. BK. REV. 186, 186–187 (1999).
86. R. B. Bernstein, Book Review, H-NET, Dec. 1999, https://networks.h-net.org/node/
16794/reviews/16915/bernstein-casto-oliver-ellsworth-and-creation-federal-republic-and.
87. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Book Review, 20 J. EARLY REP. 143, 144 (2000).
88. David P. Currie, Book Review, 105 AM. HIST. REV. 1301, 1301 (2000).
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studie[d] the work of the early Supreme Court can learn a good
deal about the individual justices from this book, and thus a lot
about the Court they composed. . . . [I] found them all interesting
and informative; the serious student of the Court’s history cannot
afford to ignore them.89
Almost certainly the most gratifying review was penned by Herbert A.
Johnson of the University of South Carolina School of Law for the American Journal of Legal History.90 Johnson, who had coauthored a Holmes
Devise book about the Marshall Court,91 opened his review with the following decree:
While many essay collections may deserve the bibliographic
graveyard to which they are assigned, it would be a crime against
scholarship if this group of biographical sketches suffered a similar fate. The distinguished contributors provide us with a convenient interpretative guide to the lives, jurisprudence, and decisionmaking of those jurists who pre-dated Chief Justice Marshall’s
tenure on the bench of the U.S. Supreme Court. Good judicial
biography is an essential building block of constitutional history,
and as such this book represents a significant contribution to our
knowledge of the early Supreme Court. It challenges us to take
the Jay and Ellsworth Courts seriously, and brings their achievements out of the shadow cast by the subsequent era of John Marshall. Throughout the volume the authors prove that the early
Court needs to be studied on its own terms and not retrospectively
by invidious comparisons to the Marshall Court.92
B. Scholarship That Has Followed Seriatim’s Publication
More important than the heart-warming praise for Seriatim, Johnson
observed that “we are at the ‘end of the beginning,’ and certainly not finished, with this scholarly project.”93 I agree. I mentioned in the Preface to
Seriatim that the book was “exploratory in nature and, it is hoped, will
provoke scholars to research the early Court more carefully than they have
in the past.”94 I am pleased to report that progress has been made.
A number of scholars cited Seriatim when discussing the judicial opinion-writing process, although many of them were focused on modern rather
than historical practices.95 However, some fine work has been done on the
89. Id. at 1301–1302.
90. Herbert A. Johnson, Book Review, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 346, 346 (2004).
91. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 8.
92. Johnson, supra note 90, at 346–347.
93. Id. at 347.
94. Scott Douglas Gerber, Preface to SERIATIM, supra note 4, at ix, x.
95. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 304 (2007); Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of
Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 261, 263 (2000); Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and
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early Court since Seriatim’s publication, including about the individual justices who preceded Marshall.
Not surprisingly, two contributors to Seriatim published terrific additional work on the pre-Marshall Court justices. Wythe Holt penned an insightful article in 1999 about John Rutledge for the Journal of Southern
Legal History in which Holt demonstrates “not only that John Rutledge was
one of the most important of our forgotten founders, but also that he is
perhaps the most forgotten of our important founders.”96 A decade later
William Casto contributed a superb article about James Iredell to a Vanderbilt Law Review symposium about judicial reputation.97 Casto concludes
that article, which was an updated version of a piece he published in the
Connecticut Law Review in 1995,98 with these words:
To a degree, the measure of a Justice’s greatness is not in the
person, but in the eyes of the beholder. We do not see the greatness of Iredell’s analysis because his theory does not comport
with the twenty-first-century practice of judicial review. Nevertheless, he offered the most comprehensive analysis and justification of judicial review ever penned by a Supreme Court Justice.
Moreover, some of his insights are timeless. In particular, his insight regarding the impact of the majority rule upon those in the
minority is as powerful today as it was over two centuries ago.99
A handful of articles and one handbook addressed the pre-Marshall
Court as an institution.100 As did the articles about individual justices, the
scholarship about the early Court as an institution tends to cite Seriatim as a
starting point. Natalie Wexler, an associate editor of The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, opens her 2006
article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review entitled “In The BeAcoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 945 (2012); Peter J. McCormick, “Was it Something
I Said?”: Losing the Majority on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada, 1984–2011, 50 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 93, 98 (2012); Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of Judicial Dissent,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 919, 919 (2012). The most surprising citation was in a 2016 amicus curiae brief
from the governor’s office in Texas. Brief for Governor Greg Abbott, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Pidgeon v. Turner, (No. 15–0688), 2016 WL 7638350, at *1, *8–9 (Tex.
June 30, 2017) (decision not yet released for publication).
96. Wythe Holt, How a Founder Becomes Forgotten: Chief Justice John Rutledge, Slavery,
and the Jay Treaty, 7 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 5, 6 (1999).
97. William R. Casto, There Were Great Men Before Agamemnon, 62 VAND. L. REV. 371
(2009). Marshall was Casto’s Agamemnon. Id. at 372.
98. See Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, supra note 38.
99. Casto, There Were Great Men Before Agamemnon, supra note 97, at 398. Law professor
and Green Bag editor-in-chief Ross E. Davies honored Iredell with the first of the “Supreme Court
Sluggers” cards issued for a pre-Marshall Court justice. See Ross E. Davies, Supreme Court Sluggers: James Iredell, 4 J.L. (3 J. LEGAL METRICS) 169 (2014).
100. See also Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit
Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003) (describing the history of circuit riding that includes a
section on the pre-Marshall Court justices).
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Seriatim-like

It comes as a surprise to many—including a number of lawyers
and law students—to learn that John Marshall was not in fact the
country’s first Chief Justice, but rather its fourth (or, according to
some recent scholarship, its fifth). Before there was Marshall,
there were John Jay, John Rutledge (briefly), possibly William
Cushing (even more briefly), and Oliver Ellsworth. While legal
historians may be familiar with these nonhousehold names, all too
often when these men, and the Court over which they presided
from 1789 to 1800, do receive mention, it is only to be dismissed
as inferior to what immediately followed. As Robert McCloskey
aptly put it in The American Supreme Court, “[t]he great shadow
of John Marshall . . . falls across our understanding of that first
decade; and it has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while they
and the audience await the appearance of the star.” In the last ten
years, scholars have begun to focus more attention on the preMarshall Court, but a certain derogatory attitude persists. One recent popular history of the Supreme Court, for example, describes
the early Justices as “a thoroughly undistinguished lot.”101
Wexler then devotes the remainder of her lengthy article to describing
the chief justice’s role from 1789 until Marshall’s arrival in 1801. R. B.
Bernstein tells a related story in a 2012/13 essay about the difficulty President Adams had in filling the chief justice’s seat prior to appointing
Marshall.102
Casto contributed yet another fine article with his 2002 piece in the
Ohio Northern University Law Review about what he denotes as “the early
Supreme Court justices’ most significant decision”: the August 8, 1793,
letter from the justices declining to provide President George Washington
with an advisory opinion about the first serious foreign affairs crisis under
the Constitution.103 A similarly outstanding focused contribution to the
scholarship about the Supreme Court before John Marshall is political scientist Charles Anthony Smith’s 2008 article in the Law & Society Review in
which Smith demonstrates that “a significant rationale for the jurisdiction
and design of the Court was to establish a credible commitment to uphold
trade agreements and resolve trade disputes with other nations.”104 Smith
101. Natalie Wexler, In The Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1373, 1373–1374 (2006) (citing SERIATIM, supra note 4, among other works).
102. R. B. Bernstein, President John Adams and Four Chief Justices: An Essay for James F.
Simon, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 441, 441–442 (2012).
103. William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Decision, 29
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 173, 173 (2002).
104. Charles Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court,
42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 75, 77 (2008).
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insists: “With Casto (1995) and Gerber (1998), I reject the conventional
wisdom about the irrelevance of the early Court.”105
The final volumes of The Documentary History of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 1789–1800, were completed in 2007, including volume 8, the concluding volume, about decisions issued by the pre-Marshall
Court.106 Canadian law professor Matthew P. Harrington published a handbook for ABC-CLIO in 2008 that included, among other items, biographies
of the pre-Marshall Court justices and A–Z entries on other significant people of the day (e.g., George Washington), important laws and constitutional
provisions (e.g., the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Article III), and concepts
(e.g., judicial review).107
Finally, but perhaps most significantly for modern students of the Supreme Court, Seriatim was mentioned in subsequent scholarship about judicial review. Mary Sarah Bilder, a 2016 recipient of the Bancroft Prize for
her book about James Madison,108 authored a 2006 article in the Yale Law
Journal that argues that “judicial review arose from a longstanding English
corporate practice under which a corporation’s ordinances were reviewed
for repugnancy to the laws of England.”109 Her thesis, she notes, builds on
the previous work of other scholars, including the contributors to Seriatim,
“who have demonstrated significant post-Revolutionary comfort with the
practice of judicial review.”110 Stephen Presser, a contributor to Seriatim,
picks up from where he left off in both Seriatim and his prior work about
Samuel Chase, and insists in a 2002 symposium in the William and Mary
Law Review about the legacy of Marshall, that Marshall’s brand of judicial
review—“an instrumentalist, positivist, centralizing, judicial supremacist
strand, one less concerned with principle and precedent, and more con105. Id. See also James W. Ely Jr., The Court that John Marshall Inherited, LIBRARY OF
LIBERTY & LAW (2013) (book review), http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/the-court-thatjohn-marshall-inherited/ (“The history of the Supreme Court before the appointment of John Marshall in 1801 has long received scant attention from scholars. The unspoken assumption was that
little of importance occurred during the Court’s first decade and that Marshall established the
Court as a major institution. This dismissive attitude has been increasingly challenged. [See Scott
Douglas Gerber, ed. Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall (1998)]. William R.
Casto has contributed significantly to a reevaluation of the early Supreme Court in this readable
and important study.”).
106. See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 13. A master’s degree thesis on the pre-Marshall Court likewise was completed in 2007. Brook Carl Poston, George’s Court: Examining the
Role of the Supreme Court Justices as Statesmen in the 1790’s (2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Missouri-Kansas City) (on file with ProQuest online database).
107. MATTHEW P. HARRINGTON, JAY AND ELLSWORTH, THE FIRST COURTS: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY (2008).
108. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
(2015).
109. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 504
(2006).
110. Id. at 507. Bilder’s citation to Seriatim led the editors of the Yale Law Journal to ask me
to write a response to Bilder’s article. I praised it. See Scott D. Gerber, The Political Theory of an
Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223 (2007).
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cerned with expedience”—is at least partially responsible for the moral relativism that has damaged modern America.111 Chase, in contrast, Presser
declares, represented another strand of judicial review, “one based in natural-law ideas running all the way back to Aristotle and Cicero, and forward
through Aquinas and Burke,” and one that “saw law as a conservative force,
and one embodying the moral principles and perhaps even the divine dictates of eternal forces.”112
I, too, have continued to explore the origins of judicial review. In fact,
my 2011 Oxford University Press book, A Distinct Judicial Power: The
Origins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606–1787, articulates a new theory
about the origins of judicial review: one that emphasizes the connection
between judicial review and the rise of judicial independence.113
CONCLUSION
Seriatim was one of the best experiences of my academic career. Not
only did it result in a number of lifelong friendships with some of the leading legal and political historians of early America in the academy today, but
the book was positively reviewed and it has sparked other scholars to author
additional interesting work about the Supreme Court before John Marshall.
More work remains to be done, but I am proud to say that Seriatim has left
its mark.

111. Stephen B. Presser, Some Alarming Aspects of the Legacies of Judicial Review and of
John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495, 1510 (2002).
112. Id. at 1511.
113. GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 34.

